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Quantum Standard: Cryptographic Destabilization Risk

1. Purpose

Manage risks arising from quantum capabilities that can weaken or break widely deployed cryptographic assumptions, including “harvest now, decrypt later” threats and downstream loss of privacy, integrity, and trust.

2. Applicability

  • Applies to any organization developing, operating, or procuring QC systems that could materially affect cryptographic security.
  • Applies to AI systems when their security depends on cryptographic properties potentially impacted by QC advances.

3. Ethical Mapping

  • A4 Trustworthiness: integrity of systems and communications
  • A3 Justice: prevention of large-scale harm and remedy readiness
  • A7 Stewardship: systemic risk management

4. Requirements (Normative)

Q-C-1 (Crypto Inventory). Tier 1–3 operators MUST maintain a cryptographic inventory covering:

  • algorithms, key sizes, protocols, certificates, and trust roots in use
  • data classes protected (including retention timelines)
  • third-party dependencies and supply chain components

Q-C-2 (Transition Plan). For Tier 2–3 systems, operators MUST maintain and periodically update a post-quantum transition plan that includes:

  • prioritization by data sensitivity and retention horizon
  • migration milestones and rollback strategies
  • testing/validation approach for cryptographic agility

Q-C-3 (Harvest-Now Risk Assessment). When sensitive data has long confidentiality requirements, operators MUST assess and document harvest-now, decrypt-later exposure and implement compensating controls (e.g., stronger hybrid protections, reduced retention, segmentation).

Q-C-4 (Disclosure of Quantum-Relevant Claims). Vendors and operators MUST NOT make unsubstantiated claims about “quantum-safe/quantum-proof” security. Any such claim MUST specify:

  • threat model assumptions
  • cryptographic components covered/excluded
  • validation method and limitations

Q-C-5 (Dual-Use Escalation). If QC capability or research materially increases cryptographic attack feasibility, Tier 3 governance MUST evaluate release/deployment under dual-use controls and document a public-interest justification or restraint decision.

5. Compliance Evidence

  • cryptographic inventory and update logs
  • post-quantum transition plan and milestone tracking
  • harvest-now risk assessment and implemented controls
  • marketing/communications review artifacts for claims
  • governance decision records for dual-use escalations

6. Rationale (Non-normative)

Cryptography is a systemic dependency. The goal is not to freeze innovation, but to ensure preparedness and truthful risk communication as quantum capabilities mature.

7. Failure Modes & Abuse Cases

  • incomplete crypto inventories leading to “unknown unknowns”
  • misleading “quantum-proof” claims driving unsafe complacency
  • long-term sensitive data exposure through delayed migration

8. Change Log

  • v0.1: Initial draft (filename: 03_quantum_standards/cryptographic_and_security_risk.md).